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Major updates were introduced in the TLS 1.3 protocol. To take advantage of the security updates within the TLS 1.3 protocol, updates are required to your System SSL application.

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol is a major rewrite of prior TLS protocol standards. After being in the works for many years in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) TLS working group, TLS 1.3 became a formal standard in August 2018 when RFC 8446 was published. In z/OS 2.4, System SSL added support for the TLS 1.3 protocol in order for z/OS applications to take advantage of the security updates.
TLS 1.3 includes the following updates:

The key pairs are generated on the fly; i.e. The key pairs are ephemeral (the E in DHE). Both client and server establish a session key. The server (or the client and server) then authenticate by performing signature-generation (for authentication). This has the advantage that each session needs to be attacked separately. Secure Socket Layer (SSL). If the Server cannot or will not resume a previous session, it generates a new session ID. Cipher Suite: This is the single cipher suite selected by the Server out of the cipher suites proposed by the Client. SSLv3 and TLS support RSA and Diffie-Hellman for key exchange.

The idea is simple: outsource session storage to clients. A session ticket is a blob of a session key and associated information encrypted by a key which is only known by the server. The ticket is sent by the server at the end of the TLS handshake. Clients supporting session tickets will cache the ticket along with the current session key. Secret code generator with key free. How does browser generate symmetric key during SSL handshake. Ask Question Asked 9 years. How does browser pick and generates this 'randomly' selected symmetric key? 2) Do developers (or/and browser users) have control on this mechanism of generating symmetric keys? I will provide summary how session key is acquired by both parties.

  • All handshake messages after the initial client and server handshake messages are now encrypted. In prior protocols, messages were not encrypted until after the final handshake messages were exchanged between the client and server.
  • Encrypted handshake messages are presented as payload messages and must be decrypted in order to determine whether the message is a handshake, payload or alert message.
  • The RSA key exchange is no longer supported. It was replaced with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE), which provides forward secrecy.
  • Prior to TLS 1.3, the negotiated key exchange was part of the cipher suite. In TLS 1.3, the negotiated key exchange is no longer part of the cipher suite and is negotiated separately.
Session

Required Updates to Enable TLS 1.3

If an existing z/OS System SSL application is being updated to support TLS 1.3, there are required updates. If the application supports parsing environment variables, they can be set to enable TLS 1.3. Otherwise, the application will need to be updated to call the System SSL

In TLSDHEPSK, the master secret is computed using the pre-shared keys and a fresh DH key that is exchanged between client and server. The TLS handshake protocol consists of 10 handshake messages and the values of p, q and g (or DH key exchange parameters) are include inside the ServerKeyExchange instead of being inside the hello messages. In the SSL handshake both the client and server generate their respective random numbers. The client then generates a pre master secret and encrypts it with the server's public key. Secure symmetric encryption achieved: The handshake is completed, and communication continues using the session keys. All TLS handshakes make use of asymmetric encryption (the public and private key), but not all will use the private key in the process of generating session keys. For instance, an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman handshake proceeds as follows.

gsk_attribute_set_**() routines.
Enabling TLS 1.3
To enable TLS 1.3, set the new GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_3 setting to ON.
Cipher specifications
TLS 1.3 introduced new ciphers that are only supported in TLS 1.3. Existing TLS 1.2 and prior ciphers are not supported in TLS 1.3. System SSL applications must programmatically enable support for 4-character ciphers by invoking gsk_attribute_set_enum() with GSK_V3_CIPHERS and GSK_V3_CIPHERS_CHAR4 values.
Because the new TLS 1.3 ciphers were not added to the default cipher list, the GSK_V3_CIPHER_SPECS_EXPANDED setting must be updated to specify at least one of the new cipher specifications. The new cipher specifications are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: New TLS 1.3 ciphers in System SSL
Key shares
The client and server sides each specify a key share group list with asymmetric groups. When the client attempts a TLS 1.3 handshake, it generates a public/private key pair for each supported group. The generated public values are put into the client’s initial handshake message. The server selects a group in common with the client’s groups and then generates its own public/private key pair for the selected group. The server takes its private value and the client’s public value to generate a shared secret, which is used to generate keys for encrypting and decrypting handshake messages. Likewise, the client generates the same shared secret with its private value associated with the server’s public value that is transmitted in the server’s initial handshake message.
System SSL has two new settings, GSK_CLIENT_TLS_KEY_SHARES and GSK_SERVER_TLS_KEY_SHARES. They specify the key share groups that are supported within the client and server, respectively. The client or server-side settings are required when TLS 1.3 handshakes are attempted in that application.
For the GSK_CLIENT_TLS_KEY_SHARES setting, keep the number of share key groups to a minimum. Public/private key pairs are generated for each key share group, which can be computationally expensive and might impact performance. For the GSK_SERVER_TLS_KEY_SHARES setting, you should list all desired supported key share groups to allow as many TLS 1.3 clients to successfully establish a secure connection.

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Table 2: Supported key share groups
Supported certificate types
As documented in the TLS 1.3 standard, System SSL only supports RSA key sizes 2048 bits and larger and ECC keys 256 bits and larger. RSA keys with a PKCS #1 v1.5 signature or with an RSASSA-PSS signature are supported.
TLS 1.3 no longer supports DSA or DH certificates. If these certificates are used in your environment, new RSA or ECC certificates must be obtained and installed in the certificate repository.

Optional Considerations for Certain Configurations

Depending on the current configuration of the application, the following might need to be considered when you migrate the System SSL application to TLS 1.3.
Supported groups or elliptic curves
A client application may specify the list of supported groups or elliptic curves with the GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST setting. When TLS 1.3 is enabled, the default GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST setting appends 0029 (x25519) to the end of the list. If the GSK_CLIENT_TLS_KEY_SHARES setting specifies 0030 (x448), you must manually update the GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST setting to include 0030 so that the key share is sent to the server. Any groups that are specified in the GSK_CLIENT_TLS_KEY_SHARES must be reflected in the GSK_CLIENT_ECURVE_LIST.
Signature and hash algorithms
The GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS setting indicates the list of supported hash and signature algorithms for use in digital signatures of X.509 certificates and TLS handshake messages. When an RSA end entity certificate is used, the TLS 1.3 handshake messages must be signed with an RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm. When enabled for TLS 1.3, the GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS default setting now includes the three new RSASSA-PSS signature and hash algorithms at the end of the list. If an application specified a GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS setting, it must be updated to include at least one of the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithms when an RSA certificate is used.
Table 3: New RSASSA-PSS signature algorithms
In z/OS 2.4, System SSL introduced the GSK_TLS_CERT_SIG_ALG_PAIRS optional setting. It lists the supported hash and signature algorithms that can be used in digital signatures of X.509 certificates. If the GSK_TLS_CERT_SIG_ALG_PAIRS setting is specified, it overrides the GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS setting when the X.509 certificate signature algorithm is checked.

TLS 1.3 Session Key Updates

TLS 1.3 no longer supports renegotiation to update session keys. Instead, it performs session key updates by exchanging a keyUpdate protocol message.
The local application can update its write key by calling
gsk_secure_socket_misc() with a GSK_RESET_CIPHER value. A keyUpdate protocol message is then sent to notify the peer to update its read key. If the peer decides to update its write key, it responds with its own keyUpdate message, which then updates the local application’s read key.
With TLS 1.3, you can update the local application’s write key (peer’s read key) by calling gsk_secure_socket_misc() with a GSK_RESET_WRITE_CIPHER value.

TLS 1.3 Session Resumption

In previous protocols, the client and server sides each maintained a session ID cache. When a client attempted to reestablish a previous connection, its cache was queried to obtain the session ID to put into the initial handshake message. When the server received the session ID, it queried its own cache to determine whether it existed and whether the connection parameters were the same. If they were the same, the server retrieved the previous connection state from its cache and indicated its acceptance by putting the same session ID in its initial handshake message that was sent to the client.

In Ssl Tls Who Generates The Session Keys

In TLS 1.3, the server no longer maintains session state in a cache. After a successful TLS 1.3 handshake, the server optionally sends a session ticket, which contains an encrypted data block of the TLS 1.3 session information, to the client. The client stores any received session tickets in its cache. When the client attempts to reestablish a previous TLS 1.3 connection, it queries the cache to obtain a valid session ticket and attaches it to the client’s initial handshake message, which the server attempts to decrypt. If the session ticket is successfully decrypted and is still valid, the server resumes the previously established connection and indicates a successfully resumed session in its initial handshake message. If the session ticket cannot be decrypted or is no longer valid, a full TLS 1.3 handshake is attempted underneath the covers.
There are new session ticket settings for the client:
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_CLIENT_ENABLE allows session tickets to be stored in the client cache. The default is ON.
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_CLIENT_MAXSIZE specifies the maximum size in bytes of a session ticket that can be stored in client cache. The default is 8192.
There are also new session ticket settings for the server:
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_SERVER_ALGORITHM specifies the session ticket encryption algorithm. The default is AESCBC128.
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_SERVER_COUNT specifies the number of session tickets that are sent after an initial TLS 1.3 handshake. The default is 2.
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_SERVER_ENABLE specifies whether the server is to send session tickets after a completed TLS 1.3 handshake. The default is ON.
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_SERVER_KEY_REFRESH specifies the key refresh interval in seconds. The default is 300 seconds.
  • GSK_SESSION_TICKET_SERVER_TIMEOUT specifies the maximum time in seconds that a TLS 1.3 session resumption attempt is allowed. The default is 300 seconds.

Take Advantage of TLS 1.3 Updates

Generates To accompany the TLS 1.3 updates done in System SSL, Application Transparent—TLS (AT-TLS) was updated to support TLS 1.3 in its policy definitions.
Major updates were introduced in the TLS 1.3 protocol. To take advantage of the security updates within the TLS 1.3 protocol, updates are required to your System SSL application.
For more information about the AT-TLS updates, see “z/OS Communications Server: IP Configuration Guide.” See “z/OS Cryptographic Services System SSL Programming” for more information about System SSL.

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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol is responsible for the authentication and key exchange necessary to establish or resume secure sessions. When establishing a secure session, the Handshake Protocol manages the following:

  • Cipher suite negotiation
  • Authentication of the server and optionally, the client
  • Session key information exchange.

Cipher Suite Negotiation

The client and server make contact and choose the cipher suite that will be used throughout their message exchange.

Authentication

In TLS, a server proves its identity to the client. The client might also need to prove its identity to the server. PKI, the use of public/private key pairs, is the basis of this authentication. The exact method used for authentication is determined by the cipher suite negotiated.

Key Exchange

The client and server exchange random numbers and a special number called the Pre-Master Secret. These numbers are combined with additional data permitting client and server to create their shared secret, called the Master Secret. The Master Secret is used by client and server to generate the write MAC secret, which is the session key used for hashing, and the write key, which is the session key used for encryption.

Establishing a Secure Session by Using TLS

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The TLS Handshake Protocol involves the following steps:

  1. The client sends a 'Client hello' message to the server, along with the client's random value and supported cipher suites.
  2. The server responds by sending a 'Server hello' message to the client, along with the server's random value.
  3. The server sends its certificate to the client for authentication and may request a certificate from the client. The server sends the 'Server hello done' message.
  4. If the server has requested a certificate from the client, the client sends it.
  5. The client creates a random Pre-Master Secret and encrypts it with the public key from the server's certificate, sending the encrypted Pre-Master Secret to the server.
  6. The server receives the Pre-Master Secret. The server and client each generate the Master Secret and session keys based on the Pre-Master Secret.
  7. The client sends 'Change cipher spec' notification to server to indicate that the client will start using the new session keys for hashing and encrypting messages. Client also sends 'Client finished' message.
  8. Server receives 'Change cipher spec' and switches its record layer security state to symmetric encryption using the session keys. Server sends 'Server finished' message to the client.
  9. Client and server can now exchange application data over the secured channel they have established. All messages sent from client to server and from server to client are encrypted using session key.

Resuming a Secure Session by Using TLS

  1. The client sends a 'Client hello' message using the Session ID of the session to be resumed.

  2. The server checks its session cache for a matching Session ID. If a match is found, and the server is able to resume the session, it sends a 'Server hello' message with the Session ID.

    Note

    If a session ID match is not found, the server generates a new session ID and the TLS client and server perform a full handshake.

  3. Client and server must exchange 'Change cipher spec' messages and send 'Client finished' and 'Server finished' messages.

  4. Client and server can now resume application data exchange over the secure channel.